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'THE RANGE OF GOODS WE LIVE BY': 
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE GARNER CONTROVERSY 
David Parker 
As you'll gather, my interest in The First Stone isn't so much in the details 
of the the so-called 'Ormond College affair' as in the terms or discourses in 
which it has been framed, first by Garner herself and then by the various 
commentators who have written on her book. My ultimate aim is to set the 
book and the commentary in a broad and I hope illuminating framework of 
ideas; ideas partly derived from the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor. 
Taylor is a Catholic, and although that orientation is important as an 
ultimate horizon in his work, he's certainly not a 'Catholic philosopher' in 
the sense that his philosophical arguments depend on a body of faith. The 
respect in which he's held in philosophical and literary circles, especially in 
the US, extends well beyond the Catholic community. One reason for 
highlighting his work this morning is that he doesn't seem to be as well 
known as he deserves to be here in Australia. My title, 'The range of goods 
we live by', is taken from Taylor's book, Sources of the Self: lite Making of 
the Modern Identity, first published in 1989. I hope that, by the end, you'll 
see the point of that title, as well as my point in making such extensive 
reference to Charles Taylor's work. 
Tire Australian's editorial of 9 August 1995 described Tire First Stone as 
a 'defining moment in the history of contemporary culture' . I think many of 
us would probably go along with this, in whatever terms we might construe 
that 'moment': either at one extreme, as this editorial saw it, as the long-
awaited time when 'certain perverse trends in contemporary radical 
feminism [were flushed) out into the open', or at the other, as the year that 
the 1990s anti-feminist backlash really got cracking in Australia. However 
we see it, The First Stone has, as another commentator has said, clearly 
touched 'some contemporary nerve' (Manne) and in that sense it is an 
important document to ponder in order to understand more about 
ourselves as a culture. 
But however important The First Stone might be as a cultural 
document, it is also very decidedly, as Helen Garner herself concedes, a book 
'full of holes' .l I myself would identify at least four major ones. 
The first and most obvious one is that it doesn't give the perspective of 
the women at the centre of the Ormond affair. As we all know, one major 
35 
Religion, Literature and lire Arls Project 
reason for this is that the complainants in the case refused to talk to Garner. 
As one critic points out, this refusal is the 'absent centre' around which 
Garner's narrative spirals; not least because her determination to tell the 
story is partly energised by what looked like their determination to keep 
possession of it. From Garner's point of view, this refusal was infuriatingly 
frustrating. If they had nothing to hide, why didn't they speak to her? Didn't 
they recognise her own feminist credentials? If she was missing the point, 
why didn't they try to show it to her, to convince her? After all, they were 
university people, supposedly committed to free and open discussion. Why 
then this secrecy? It's not hard to see how their refusal might have 
confirmed in Garner's mind the impression she already had that the 
women were 'illiberal', committed above all to controlling events for their 
own political purposes. Now that we have the version of events given to us 
by Dr Jenna Mead, who was the senior woman at Ormond and adviser and 
support to the students concerned, we can also see something of their 
perspective. They had been through months attempting to get what they 
saw as an obstructive and even intimidatory College council to attend to 
their complaints in a satisfactory way, and then through the anxieties and 
frustrations of a court case and an appeal that finally exonerated the Master. 
It was doubtful, once the law was involved, whether they would have 
spoken to Garner in any case. But it's not hard to see how they might have 
been utterly resolved in their position once a copy of Helen Garner's letter 
to the Master came into their possession. Garner wrote: 
What I want to say is that it's heartbreaking, for a feminist of nearly fifty like me, to 
see our Ideals of so many years distorted Into this ghastly punitiveness. I expect I will 
never know what 'really happened', but I certainly know that if there was an Incident, 
as alleged, this has been the most appallingly destructive, priggish and pitiless way 
of dealing with it. I want you to know that there are plenty of women out there who 
step back In dismay from the kind of treatment you have received, and who still hope 
that men and women, for all our foolishness and mistakes, can behave towards each 
other with kindness rather than being engaged In this kind of warfare ... (16) 
Allan Patience, in an sane and balanced account of the book2 calls this 
letter 'impulsive' and 'hastily judgemental', and there's some justice in 
these terms. He also points out that Garner's mind seems to be irrevocably 
made up. Terms like 'ghastly punitiveness', 'appallingly destructive' and 
'pitiless' can only have suggested to the women that Garner was 'out to get 
them'. It's certainly understandable, at the very least, that they gave her a 
wide berth. But Garner, in her understandable frustration with them and 
sympathy for the Master, doesn't seem able to allow herself to entertain 
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what Emanuel Levinas would call the 'otherness' of their perspective - and 
it is this constriction of imagination, over and above sheer ignorance of the 
facts, that constitutes the first 'hole' in her book. 
The second is Garner's inability to understand why the women went to 
the police. Garner is so much moved by seeing the consequences of the 
court case and its attendant publicity on the Master and his family, together 
with questions of the proportionality of justice raised by these consequences, 
that she is inclined to a reductive view of events of the kind 'he touched her 
on the breast and she went to the cops' - and his life was ruined as a 
consequence. What this view implies is that the students went straight to 
the police. In what Tile Canberra Times calls the 'Other Side' of the Ormond 
story, Jenna Mead takes Garner to task for the notion that the students 
concerned rejected all possibility of reconciliation. 'This is an astonishing 
distortion of the facts,' says Mead. 'As an eye witness to these events, I saw 
the students constantly rebuffed and pressured. Those students spent six 
months trying to resolve their complaints to Ormond College, 
confidentially.' Only when that approach failed did they go to the police. 
According to Mead, this hole in Garner's account isn't due to lack of access 
to the complainants, but a wilful refusal to give due weight to facts she 
knew about. Whether that's true or not, there are clear grounds for thinking 
that the students didn't go to the police simply out of 'punitiveness'. 
A third 'hole' is Garner's failure to grasp the seriousness of what the 
Master Is alleged to have done. I say 'alleged' because of course it hasn't been 
established beyond reasonable doubt that he did the things he is accused of. 
It remains possible that Dr Gregory was the victim of a conspiracy as he 
claims. Or it may well be, as Drusilla Modjeska believes, that 'something 
happened' that night along the lines of the students'allegations. Assuming 
that it did, the Master, as Mead says, was not 'just any other bloke to be told 
to piss off'. As Master, he had a special responsibility of care by virtue of his 
position. Any action of the sort he is accused of constitutes a serious abuse of 
his position. As Robert Manne says in his editorial in Quadrant, 'if the 
Master of Ormond, charged as he was with a duty of care over a new 
generation of undergraduates, did 'as much' as Nicole and Elizabeth allege, 
it amounted to, surely, more than a mere 'nerdish pass'. 
The last 'hole' is the fact that Garner takes a novelist's license to 
fictionalise Dr Jenna Mead into six or seven different characters. I've seen a 
suggestion that Garner may have done this for legal reasons, but whatever 
truth there may be in that, there can be no doubt that it speciously 
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strengthens the impression in her book of a feminist cabal at Ormond 
conspiring to bring the Master down. 
Well, with so many holes, what's left in Tile First Stone to deserve 
further discussion? My view is that the book is still important for us to 
think about partly because it insists on seeing the Ormond affair in explicitly 
etllical terms. What I haven't seen taken up anywhere is the epigraph from 
Zoe Heller. It says: 
The struggle for women's rights Is ... not a matter of gender loyalty. It is a matter of 
ethical principle, and as such, it does not dictate automatic allegiance to the women's 
side in any given argument. 
By 'ethical principle' I take it Heller means that feminism matters; it has a 
moral claim on us, in that it is struggling to achieve certain valuable ends or 
goods - for example, justice, or equality of rights, recognition or respect. The 
force of the word 'principle' is that these goods are valuable for everyone, 
irrespective of gender (or creed or race); they are 'difference-blind' (Charles 
Taylor). If you believe that these goods are what the struggle is for, then you 
won't automatically vote party-line on every issue. There may even be 
issues in which, on principle, you will cross the floor. 
I think there can be no doubt that this is the version of feminism that 
Garner is espousing. At a certain point Garner reports a conversation with a 
friend who is arguing that the Master of Ormond is paying for the many 
other men who have not been caught. 'It's the irony of things,' says the 
friend, 'that the innocent or nearly-innocent pay for what the guilty have 
done.' Garner comments: 'Yes, and you can't make an omelette without 
breaking eggs: what a cruel and ethically rotten argument.' To another 
acquaintance, who makes a similar argument, Garner says: 
'How can this be ethical, that punishment is skewed like this - so that the wrong 
person carries the can?' She looked at me with a kind of accusing surprise ... Once again, 
I looked hard-hearted, on the wrong team, a turncoat, lacking political passion and 
solidarity (181-2). 
One of the reasons I have quoted from that passage is that it illustrates a 
crucial distinction in Garner's discussion of these issues, the distinction 
between the 'ethical' and the 'political'. 
Now these are notoriously slippery terms. You don't have to think 
about them for very long before they start to leach into one another and 
before long you're bogged in a semantic and conceptual swamp. If I define 
the discursive space of the ethical as any answer to the question, 'How 
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should a human being live?', then there is no politics I can think of that 
doesn't at least imply some answer to that question. In other words, there's 
no excluding ethics from politics. And equally, since we tend to subscribe 
these days to the view that 'the personal is political', then it's hard to think 
of any ethical belief that would count for many of us as entirely politically 
neutral. 
So how can we or Garner separate them? I would suggest that we could 
do it very provisionally as follows: if the discursive space of ethical is 'How 
should a human being live?' then it is clear that ethics is centred on goods 
in a way that's 'difference-blind' across the whole human community. By 
contrast we might say that in our so-called postmodern era 'politics' has 
come to mean the organised struggle for power between various groups in 
society. While this wouldn't have done for Aristotle, the 'political' has to 
come to be identified in much contemporary discourse, reductively I 
believe, with the will-to-power of sections of society. Defined in this way, 
politics is centred precisely on 'difference' -differences of class, gender, race, 
ethnicity and so on. In these terms, feminism may be seen not as an 'ethical 
principle' but as a subset of the 'politics of difference', part of the discourse of 
power ... 
So the model I'm proposing for the notional separation of ethics and 
politics is that they are separate discourses, or ways of ploughing the field of 
experience, one difference-blind, the other focused on difference. It's in this 
sense that Garner can talk about a dash between her feminism and her 
ethics. She says: 
I had thought of myself as a feminist, and had tried to act like one, for most of my 
ndult life. It shocked me that now, though my experience of the world would usually 
have disposed me otherwise, I felt so much sympathy for the man In this story and so 
little for the women. I had a horrible feeling that my feminism and my ethics were 
speeding towards a head-Qn smash. I tried to tum on this gut reaction what they call 'a 
se;uchlng and fearless moral lnventory'(39). 
I'd like to note in passing at this stage just how much Garner's 
response is based on intuitive feeling, what she calls the 'gut reaction' that 
precedes ethical reflection. I'll return to this point later. By 'ethics' in this 
passage Garner partly means her intuitive 'sympathy' with the Master. In 
her talk at the Sydney Institute, she said that she was trying to show 'that it 
might be possible to admit sympathy in human terms with people on the 
opposite side of a power divide'.3 I take it that what she means by the phrase 
'in human terms' is that 'sympathy', as an ethical good, will tend to focus on 
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another human being simply as human being, irrespective of their position 
in the political picture of differential power-relations. 
My view in a nutshell is that both perspectives, the ethical and the 
political, are necessary to us if we are to make the fullest sense of our 
experience either of life or literary texts. The corollary is that neither 
perspective alone is sufficient. The greatest understanding, in other words, 
comes from a dialogic, multi-perspective reading, one that doesn't insist on 
closure in any one set of terms or discourse. My reading of the responses to 
the Garner controversy is (as I'll try to show) that they have tended on the 
whole to occlude the ethical, and reassert the political as a master-discourse. 
I'd also say that that isn't at all surprising, given the epistemic power of 
political forms of reading over the past 25 years. Part of the contemporary 
significance of The First Stone as a 'moment' in our culture is that it shows 
the resurgence of explicit ethical discourse. But I'm leaping ahead of myself. 
Most of the unfavourable notices of Garner's book have either made 
the point or taken it for granted that the Ormond events were 'really' or 
'essentially' political. This is the line taken by such diverse commentators as 
Robert Manne in his editorial in Quadrant and Jenna Mead in her lecture at 
the Sydney Institute. Manne says that 'precisely because [Garner's) account of 
the affair is so non-political' the answers to the central questions she poses 
are 'unnecessarily obscure'.4 Jennifer McDonnell, in her review in The 
Canberra Times (8 April 1995), says that Garner's reading of the Ormond 
case is 'reductive'. She says 'it was clearly about entrenched institutionalised 
power.' But there's a form of interpretive closure in McDonnell's own 
account which is arguably just as reductive: 'Garner's pleas for "kindness" in 
our dealings with each other ... is laudable', she says. 'Unfortunately, sexist 
institutions do not yield power because women are kind to them and have 
patiently waited long enough. The only language the status quo 
understands is money, vote and public embarrassment.' There's an 
undeniable kernel of truth in that, of course: power will only yield to power. 
That's why I've said that the political is a necessary perspective. A politics 
confined to 'pleas for kindness' would amount to political quietism, and 
Garner certainly isn't seriously proposing that. I think McDonnell only 
makes this point in order to make Garner's 'pleas for kindness' seem 
ineffectual, unreal; calling them 'laudable' is really only a species of put-
down. A similar put-down is the word 'innocent', used by more than one 
commentator. A related one is used by Cassandra Pybus in her review when 
she contrasts hard-headed analysis of the 'issues' to the weight given to the 
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novelist's indulgent 'feelings'. 'Kindness' and 'sympathy' are soft, not in 
touch with the 'impersonal' street-wise realities of power. 
What hovers over all of this discussion is the bias of the iast 25 years in 
the humanities that says when you talk about power you're talking about 
things that are really real. The corollary of this is that talking about nice, 
laudable things like 'sympathy' and 'kindness' is either obscuring these 
really real issues, or worse, by this means actually helping to keep the status 
quo in power. This has been a very familiar line of argument in the past 
twenty five years. It is partly Marxist and partly neo-Nietzschean; it's the 
radical argument that says that the ethical is false consciousness, a species of 
conservative or patriarchal ideology. Jenna Mead, in her own reading, takes 
this line when she sees The First Stone as 
a version of middleoi:lass family romance in which men as fathers rule and are obeyed 
and flattered by women as mothers. The payoff is that mothers control the daughters 
by telling them what to do as advice on being feminine ... the word for this arrangement 
Is patriarchy. 
Whatever the particular merits of Mead's reading, its procedure is to 
deconstruct Garner's narrative into a political master-narrative about 
patriarchal power. 
Garner in a sense anticipates Mead's response by pointing to a frequent 
characteristic of this form of master-narrative: it excludes any alternatives to 
a set of binary oppositions. All that's not directly opposed to patriarchal 
power is in some sense for it. 'So the world, to Margaret L,' she writes, 'was 
divided into harassers and harassed. If one were not completely with her, 
one was the enemy' (82), or 'part of the nineties onslaught against 
feminism' (178). What Garner is pointing to here is the totalising and rigidly 
dualistic pattern of some radical strains of thought, including some forms of 
feminism, and she is not the only feminist to do so. Drusilla Modjeska, in 
her short review, makes the key point that to 
Insist on a dichotomised structure of power- guilty or innocent, victim or abuser- ensures 
that everyone, including those who have been Injured, lose in the struggle to shaft 
home lo others the wrong sort of responsibility. 
The rigid dichotomy, in other words, figures others, those on the other 
side of the divide, as responsible. Like many other contemporary feminists, 
such as Jessica Benjamin and Anna Yeatman, Modjeska points to the need 
to transcend the heavily moralistic ethos of this dualistic mode of thought, 
to find space for a fuller, more considered response. She argues that it is the 
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special responsibility of the creative writer, as opposed to the bureaucrat or 
legislator, 'to stand back from the fray of the moment' precisely to see life 
more steadily and whole. And an important part of the whole picture, 
according to her, is Garner's moving presentation of the Master's wife. She 
says that Garner's 'openness to the complexities' of this woman's situation 
'allowed her to write a book on this most thorny subject and offer us a way 
of tllinking towards a response that lays down the stone.' 
' ... thinking towards a response that lays down the stone.' That goes to 
the very heart of my argument. But like most metaphors it presents 
uncertainties and ambiguities. What precisely is meant by laying down the 
stone? Giving up the struggle perhaps? Refusing to blame or to punish 
wrongdoers? Perhaps in some cases then the stone needs to be cast? The 
answers to these questions, I'd suggest, lie in the gospel narrative which 
gives Helen Garner her title. There are, of course, many different ways of 
approaching that narrative. My own approach is to take it purely as an 
ethical and literary text. One of the things I mean by this is that I don't 
interpret the casting of stones as primarily a judicial act, the carrying out of a 
legal sentence, which indeed it was at the time of this narrative. So I don't 
see laying down the stone in this context as a refusal tout court to pursue a 
wrongdoer by legal means. So far as I know, this has never been a serious 
option in any Christian culture. My own approach is to see the woman 
taken in adultery as a story about judgmentalism and about moving beyond 
it. 
The Pharisees' judgmentalism is a rigid adherence to a moral code, a 
system of clear-cut categories: adultery is wrong, the woman is a sinner. 
They, by implication, are in the right: they are the righteous, the Law-
followers. The code is one of simple and rigid binary differences: good 
versus evil, right versus wrong. They are within the Law, she is outside, 
Other, forfeiting her claim to membership of the tribe. Her humanity can 
therefore be cancelled. In the strongest possible way she is being 
marginalised, while they affirm their centeredness, their subjectivity, their 
claim to be the meaning of the moral text. They are also, according to the 
narrative, power-seeking; they belong to a kind of theocratic New Right 
trying to trap this revolutionary either into open rejection of the Law or 
into open rejection of his own teaching. In this sense, they are effectively 
reactionaries, attempting to enforce Judaic solidarity. 
The core of the biblical narrative as I read it is this: Jesus's reply forces 
the woman's accusers to look into their consciences and admit that they are 
not simply 'different' from her; they look within themselves and find an 
42 
1996 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 
element of similarity to her, which convinces them that they do not belong 
to another moral universe at all. This point needs to be underlined, because 
Jesus is not simply objecting to judgments of moral 'difference' per se; the 
woman is still guilty of this serious sin, which presumably the Pharisees are 
not. He is objecting to an ethic of difference that obliterates any sense of 
common humanity. It is this element of commonness, of human 
continuity, the fact they are sinners too, that the Pharisees, in the grip of 
their rigid binary code, appear to have forgotten. Jesus's reply forces them to 
look within and to recollect two things. First, those traditions within 
Judaism itself saying that God alone should judge. And secondly the fact 
that the binary opposition, as the Deconstructionist would say, already exists 
within themselves: their righteousness already differs from itself. 
Judgmentalism, in short, is a form of forgetting, of moral 
obliviousness. Carl Jung would go further and argue that the Pharisees in 
this story are externalising their psychic 'shadow' - that is, the darker side of 
thunselves that resists the moral Law by which they try to live. Jung's point 
is that they can only silence the accusations of the shadow within by 
projecting them onto some scapegoat beyond themselves. The aim of 
Jungian therapy here is to bring the patient to embrace all that he or she is, 
which must include both the binary terms in question, the good and the 
evil, whatever they are. Along the way Jung makes the very incisive point 
that intense commitment to any good is fraught with psychic danger: 'In the 
last resort there is no good that cannot produce evil and no evil that cannot 
produce good.' 
The insight at the heart of the gospel narrative, then, is that the route 
beyond judgmentalism is by way of fuller self-recognition. The Pharisees' 
laying down the stone signifies a new awareness. We can call this new 
awareness empathy or 'vicarious introspection' or, as I think the moral 
philosopher Thomas Nagel might put it, we can say that Jesus's reply opens 
up an ethical spa!:e which is 'intersubjective'. That is, there is a way of 
recollecting our own subjective lives which is also, by implication, a way of 
understanding someone else- not simply as an Other, a 'she', but as another 
subjectivity not altogether discontinuous with our own. I believe that Helen 
Garner's emphasis on 'kindness' and 'sympathy' is an expression of the 
same moral intuition, an attempt to open up an intersubjective space large 
enough !o <:ontain figures, such as the Master and his wife, who would 
sometimes simply be Other to radical feminist· analysis; mere 
representatives of institutional power. 
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The other main point to be drawn out of this story of the Pharisees is 
that they no doubt cared about casting stones out of an intense, single-
minded and over-riding commitment to a good, the good of justice. Jung's 
point is that, in structuring the world into clear hierarchies of binary 
difference, such a thirst for righteousness can produce evil. The same in fact 
holds for any belief system, be it ethical, religious, or political. It is as true of 
Marxism or feminism as it is of any theological creed: all can degenerate 
into dividing the world rigidly into sheep and goats. And all can prosecute 
the business of searching out the goats, and all the secret ideological hiding 
places of goatism, with puritanical self-righteousness. What begins as a just 
project for the proper political recognition of difference sometimes tips over 
into a zealous intolerance of it. Which I think is the other side of the moral 
intuition governing Tile First Stone: without a countervailing spirit of 
'human-kindness' the single-minded pursuit of sexual justice can descend 
into judgmentalism - hence Garner's use of words such as 'puritanical', 
'legalistic', 'punitive' and 'self-righteous'. One significant fount of all of 
these is the picture of the Pharisees drawn in the New Testament. 
In some respects, in fact, the moral feeling Garner draws on in tapping 
into this biblical source runs well ahead of the facts. The students concerned 
in the Ormond case, as we saw, didn't go to the police simply out of 
pharisaical punitiveness or self-righteousness. By the same token, the leaflet 
circulated anonymously at Ormond concerning the Master certainly 
suggests that someone in the College was prepared to cast stones: It says: 'If 
Shepherd is not promptly removed, he will commit offences of a similar 
nature or worse. If attacked by Shepherd, please - do not panic - call the 
police. Tllere is no guarantee his next crime will not be rape or battery' (42). 
Even on the assumption that the Master did everything he was accused of, 
there's clearly an element of demonisation in this picture of him, 
something of the 'witch hunt'. On the other hand, many readers feel, myself 
included, that the witch hunting in The First Stone isn't entirely one way. 
As a way into that point, I'd like to mention a paper I heard last year by 
John Docker in which he pointed out the subtle importance given to the 
Jewishness of the student Garner calls 'Elizabeth Rosen'. Docker's point was 
that the feminists were associated with a legalism that has caricatured Judaic 
overtones. One of them reportedly says: 'I'm against people having to go 
through conciliation before there can be retribution.' 'Retribution?' Garner 
replies. 'The Old Testament word took my breath away.' She, by contrast, 
talks of her desire to have 'mercy' (98). 'Dr Shepherd', the fictional name 
given to Dr Gregory, has obvious Christian overtones, and there is talk of 
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him being sacrificed for other men's offences, or as a 'goodhearted naif' who 
has 'been thrown to the lions' (147). I think that there's an element of truth 
in other words in Docker's contention that there's a Jewish/Christian binary 
at the heart of this book. I'd also agree with his implicit point that there are 
potential dangers in such a binary, dangers which are continuous with those 
we face if we're tempted to assimilate pharisaism to Judaism, or else if we 
fail to note that the Pharisees as they are mostly figured in the New 
Testament are the constructions of a writer with a particular set of 
ecclesiological and theological designs. Representing the whole truth about 
the historical Pharisees certainly wasn't one of them. Another way to heed 
these dangers is to remind ourselves that the Pharisees in the gospel 
narrative we've been looking at could presumably see Jesus's point because 
of traditions (which they would have shared with him) of anti-legalism and 
anti-judgmentalism within Judaism itself. Perhaps the most important 
reflection we can make, however, is the one made by Hans Kung in 0 n 
Being a C/rristian: 'But Pharisaism lives on also - and sometimes more so -
in Christianity'. (211) The recent film Priest makes that point very 
eloquently. 
The reason that 'Pharisaism' does live on is that the very making of 
moral judgments, as Nietzsche acutely realised, is shadowed by 'Pharisaism'. 
(Indeed, it's for a closely-related reason that I prefer the word 
'judgmentalism'.) I'm sure I don't have to insist to an audience 'such as this 
that judgmentalism is there at every turn in the moral life; the very 
necessity - and it is a necessity - to discriminate in binary terms brings with it 
the temptation of ranging ourselves on the side of the angels. The forces 
pulling us this way are part of the condition of being human, especially in 
the heat of battle for things that really matter. So it's more than a pat irony 
that Helen Garner, with stone-throwing in her sights, might be justly 
described by Jennifer McDonnell as herself 'guilty of throwing stones'. She 
goes on to say: 'The book becomes shrill when the women and their 
supporters are described as 'puritan feminists', a 'priggish, literal-minded 
vengeance squad' .. .' 
'The book becomes shrill .. .' The discernment of different tones of voice 
and their meanings is a crucial but much undervalued part of critical 
reading in this over-theoretical moment in our cultural history. My own 
view is that this capacity is part of what might be termed readerly practical 
wisdom, and as such begins in feeling, or what Garner calls 'gut reaction'. 
The importance of feeling, even in philosophy, has recently been brilliantly 
defended by the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum when she writes 
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about the 'epistemological value' of feeling; for her, feeling is closely linked 
to 'our beliefs about how things are and what is important' (Love's 
Knowledge, p. 41). I wouldn't want to be misunderstood as saying 
something over-simple - feelings, as Nussbaum says, are not 'self-certifying 
sources of ethical truth' - but they are pointers which our over-cerebral high 
culture has all too often learned to ignore. If a critic feels the book becoming 
shrill, and you and I feel it too, then we can talk about sharing a judgment, 
or a common consciousness, which tells us that Garner herself is beginning 
to throw stones. 
But where does this shared response come from? What is it based on? 
Certainly I'm not suggesting any essentialist or universalist notion of 
'conscience' or of human nature. I may in fact want to affirm some such 
notion, but it is not entailed in or required by the account I'm presently 
giving. This is a crucial point for a defence of the ethical in a climate of post-
modernist assumptions, for these are the grounds on which ethics and 
ethical criticism are sometimes dismissed. If we share a judgment about 
literature or life, then that will be partly culturally or historically 
constituted. In the present case, the feeling that Garner's tone is becoming 
shrill and that she is herself becoming judgmental is made possible partly by 
the fact that we all share an ethical tradition of which the story of the 
woman taken in adultery is a significant part. In Garner's case, the title of 
her book makes that explicit, but even if it weren't conscious, the power of 
the story as a source of moral discrimination would be there in the cultural 
background as a significant element. The Pharisees are a version of what 
Alasdair Mcintyre calls 'characters': they enable us to articulate an ethical 
distinction, in this case between the judgmental and the non-judgmental. 
And what I am suggesting is that they do that even if we make such 
judgments as it were instinctively, as inarticulate feeling. 
The implicit foil to the Pharisees is of course the response of Jesus, 
which, without denying the woman's sin, is non-judgmental. My point 
here would be that we inheritors of Judeo-Christian culture are so deeply 
formed by the rightness and moral profundity of that characteristic response 
of his, it is so much part of who we are and what we value as good, so basic 
to what Charles Taylor calls our moral ontology, that we instinctively find 
literature or art that responds to life in a similar way as deep and balanced 
and full. 'Consider what we learn from contemplating the characters of 
Shakespeare and Tolstoy', says Iris Murdoch in The Sovereignty of Good. 
'What is learnt here is something about the real quality of human nature, 
when it is envisaged, in the artist's just and compassionate vision, with a 
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clarity that does not belong to the self-centred rush of ordinary life.' 'Just and 
compassionate': One very significant source of the value we tend to place on 
that particular conjunction of qualities, in art as in life, is the figure of Jesus 
in the gospels. 
In talking as I have been I am drawing fairly heavily on the work of 
Charles Taylor, particularly his magnum opus Sources of the Self. Taylor's 
argument starts with the notion that 'all of us as human agents define 
ourselves against a background of distinctions of worth'. What he's arguing 
against is both the dominant 'naturalist' or sceptical temper of Anglo-
American philosophy as well as the neo-Nietzschean temper of post-
modernist theory - both of which tend to present our moral int!J.itions as 
mere projections onto a morally-neutral world. An orientation to a good is 
seen by these sceptics as something like an optional extra that we're free to 
adopt or reject as we choose. Taylor shows how this notion is inherently 
mistaken by showing that identity, our sense of who are, is a kind of 
'orientation in moral space'. To be without any evaluative framework at all 
would involve a profound psychic disorientation; such a person would not 
simply be morally shallow or unpredictable, he or she would be 
frighteningly disturbed, perhaps pathological. For a person of relative 
· normality the sceptical picture cannot obtain, simply on the grounds that 
. such a person must be oriented in terms of the multiple evaluative 
distinctions needed to answer for herself in everyday life. 
Taylor also rejects the sort of Foucaultian argument I talked about 
earlier, which recognises rightly that some visions of good may be 
connected to certain forms of domination, but wrongly infers from this that 
all views of the good are simply enterprises of domination. Taylor says, as 
he argues against Foucault: 'This would be to fail to recognise how one's 
own position is powered by a vision of the good.' (100) This is a key idea of 
Taylor's: it's possible to live by goods we fail to acknowledge or even to 
recognise. Indeed his argument is that modern thought on the whole 
obscures many of the goods we actually live by, and he sees his task as 
working through what he calls layers of modern suppression in order to 
recover these goods from a kind of 'naturalistic bewitchment'. Part of the 
problem has been that natural science, with its immense modern prestige, 
has encouraged us to ignore our own anthropocentric reactions, including 
significantly our own spontaneous moral feelings and pre-articulate gut 
reactions. 'My perspective', says Taylor, 'is defined by the moral intuitions I 
have, by what I am morally moved by:' (73) intuitions are the basis of 
47 
Religion, Literature and tire Arts Project 
practical reason, which consists partly in articulating the moral point of the 
actions our intuitions enjoin on us, or present as admirable (78). 
Being articulate about the good is important for Taylor. 'We aren't full 
human beings,' he says echoing Plato, 'until we can say what moves us, 
what our lives are built around.' Articulating the good can bring it closer as 
a moral source. The 'moral source' is another key notion: it is something 
the love of which empowers us to do and be good. In the Judeo-christian 
tradition, for example, the supreme good is God, his agape for us and ours 
for him. However, the stories about God and images of him in the Bible 
remain something of a moral source even for many of our contemporaries 
who have abandoned the theological and philosophical doctrines 
surrounding them. For example, the Exodus story has inspired several 
secular revolutionary and liberationist movements. 'Even where the 
theology is lost, the story marches on.' This is because seeing one's life in the 
pattern of the Exodus story still 'carries tremendous moral power.' (95) This 
of course was the case I was arguing about the story of the woman taken in 
adultery. 
Taylor sees the job of tracing the sources of the ideas we moderns find 
morally empowering as an historical undertaking. 400 out of the 500 or so 
pages of Sources of tire Self are devoted to an analysis - it's simply breath-
taking in its breadth of reference - which traces the spiritual visions and 
sources denied by modern theories but which still unconsciously inform 
them. What this history mainly consists of is the story of how one vision of 
the good gives way to another. It's an extremely complex evolutionary story, 
in which certain extremely powerful visions of the good, called 
'hypergoods', tend to supersede earlier pictures of the good, often 
assimilating features of the goods they supersede. Platonism swallows 
heroic morality, Christianity swallows Platonism, Enlightenment notions of 
detached reason, universal justice and benevolence swallow Christianity 
before they are swallowed in turn by post-modern, neo-Nietzschean 
theories. However, as you'll already realise, that's too simple. 'The older 
condemned goods remain; they resist; some seem ineradicable from the 
human heart.' (65). 
Now that's the nub of my argument. The goods we live by are in 
conflict with each other. The Enlightenment-derived demands of equal and 
universal respect and self-determining freedom which are some of the 
sources of feminism inevitably conflict with older goods of community, 
friendship and traditional identity - the sacrifice of which may bring 
consequences that seem 'utterly unacceptable' (101). Taylor's startling claim 
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is that 'we are and cannot but be on both sides of the great intramural 
debates' of our culture, 'between the espousal of hypergoods and the defence 
of those goods which are to be sacrificed in their name.' (105) 'We cannot but 
be on both sides .. .' What can thls mean? Taylor's argument is that if we 
pursue one good at the expense of all others, we are likely to end up with an 
evil. For example, Nazism might be seen as pursuing the single good of 
nationalism at the price of all else. Taylor concludes: 'following a single 
good to the end may be catastrophic, not because it isn't a good, but because 
there are others which can't be sacrificed without evil.' (503) In the present 
case, just because some radical forms of feminism, if pursued single-
mindedly, can lead to judgmental stone-throwing, doesn't invalidate sexual 
justice as a good. Nor is Garner's 'sympathy' worthless simply because a 
single-minded ethlc of that kind might tend to entrench injustice. We can't 
without loss forego either good. They are part of the full 'range of goods we 
live by' - and need to live by, consciously and articulately, if we're to live as 
well as we can. 
REFERENCES 
1 The A11stralinn, 9 August 1995, p. 11 . 
2 Cnmp11s Rroiew, April 20, 1995, pp. 7-8. 
3 The A11slrnlinn, 9 August 1995, p . tt. 
4 Q11ndranl, May, 1995, p. 3. 
49 
